The Cruel Sea

[camaraderie]

Here's the story of the Valiant that was lost w/ 2 dead last week. As the Dawg says...the boat is tougher than the crew...again. A real tragedy:

http://www.nypost.com/seven/11182007...ror_231456.htm

[bestfriend]

Two things, why would you set out to a destination that had a storm approaching it? And don't abandon ship unless it sinks under you.

[Valiente]

Wow. It's a textbook case of what not to do. It's like the Katana in The Perfect Storm, really.

I don't know what the answer is. Don't bring crew that don't understand "inside" is better than "out"? Hit them on the head and tie them up?

There are so many other ways this could have ended. They could have turned around or headed due west on a beam reach. They could have hove to or ridden to a sea anchor. Of course, a bunch of puking, hysterical people confined to a rolly cabin is bad, but somehow they either never got "the talk" from the skipper, who knew, probably, how it would end, or the skipper never conveyed to them the gravity of attempting to leave the boat in a hurricane.

They could have had a 300 foot line sent to them via messenger, and set up a harness and hoist. They could have just sat tight. Even a liferaft would have been better.

Man. That's one ugly story. But it's not the sea's fault.

[Sailormann]

It's a sorry story. Easy for us to postulate about what went wrong from the comfort of our computer desks, very different when you're out there. It can indeed seem that the world is coming to an end. If there's anything to be taken from this, I guess it's best to stick with experienced crew and the Valiant seems to be a pretty tough hull.

[sailaway21]

I think that Val probably hits the nail on the head with his comment on "the talk". Ships and boats are not politically correct. There is one master and the name is given for a reason. When embarking inexperienced crew it is essential that they understand that they are engaging in something where they will have to rely on your skill and knowledge and that the adventure is not some form of sea-going debate society. Witness experienced seamen's actions. When under the command of another vessel's master they respond quickly and efficiently to his orders even though they may have vastly more experience and might choose to do things differently were they themselves in command. What these men know is that when they stop to quibble it upsets the whole order of the vessel and that lesser experienced crew might get the impression that questioning orders is acceptable. And, when in extremis, this behavior can prove fatal. The master of this vessel lost control of his crew. We can only speculate as to whether it was due to his actions previously or that his crew was made up of highly educated people who incorrectly thought they could substitute their judgement for the master's. I would perhaps question the master's judgement in taking that number of inexperienced crew, but that may well be unfair on my part.

The incident also points out another fact too little acknowledged by many. It's a big ocean. They had a good size cargo ship alongside and one singularly ill equipped to handle the rescue of men from the sea. It would take a fit man all of his strength to scale the side of such a ship via cargo net. On the other hand, the ship was of perfect size and design to provide a lee and an uncomfortable, but safe, way to ride out that storm on board the Albatross. Notice also how long it took to locate the Albastross later, when her exact position was known only a few hours earlier. Fortytwo feet is less than a speck on the ocean. Heck, six hundred feet can be less than a speck on the ocean. For those techno wizards among us it should be apparent that the only way to ensure the finding of each person would have been if each had their own transponder-not a likely commonality. When ship's crews abandon ship into even forty foot lifeboats they become exponentially more difficult to find. And the bottom line is that when individuals enter the water, in conditions not nearly as rough as these, they are seldom found again-ever.

I do feel a tremendous empathy for the Albatross' master-he must be devastated. I think the true tragedy was that they were in a progressively more safe situation that they chose to abandon.

[SimonV]

That was a heavy story. But one man with a level head is no match for four panicing individuals with mob mentality, as it said the crew forced him to put out a distress call. At this point I would guess he had then began to doubt himself and the vessel.

[Sapperwhite]

Originally Posted by bestfriend

Two things, why would you set out to a destination that had a storm approaching it? And don't abandon ship unless it sinks under you.

"At 6:25 a.m. on Nov. 4, the Martorell reported that the winds had calmed to about 30 mph and the waves were just under 20 feet high. The sun was up and visibility was good, it said. The ship checked in again at 9:17 a.m. and said the search continued."

Only 10 hours after they all jumped in the water the conditions were cut in half, that's the sad part. Like BF and countless others have said, don't step down into a liferaft (with a few rare exceptions). Even with the mast broken they could have motored the rest of the way to Bermuda.

"It was a senseless thing. He kept saying, 'I told them not to abandon ship.'" That about says it all.

[sailingdog]

A couple of questions I have are:

1) How much experience did the captain and crew have?

Yes, he had a bluewater capable boat, and the captain seems to be fairly experienced...but his crew sounds like all non-sailors. I think a passage into the teeth of an RTS is a bad idea—an certainly not a good idea for an inexperienced crew. A more experienced crew would understand that a boat like the Valiant 42, properly handled, could make an ill-planned passage and not panic.

2) What the hell was the captain thinking?

Nowadays, we have pretty good storm tracking and prediction... While it isn't always spot on...it is good enough to give you a clue whether in five days time you'll be in the teeth of a storm or not usually. Granted, it is often hard to think about the future, given blue skies and good sailing weather....but on an extended passage, during hurricane season... I think the captain has the obligation to consider his alternatives should a storm be forecast—and this storm wasn't exactly a complete surprise. It also sounds like his boat was equipped with a satellite phone, so he should have been able to get weather data on at least a daily basis....and should have had at least a rough idea of the storm's track and progress. If he wasn't monitoring the weather...then the sea can't be blamed for that failure or the resulting deaths.

3) In preparation for this bluewater passage, did he have any other emergency equipment aboard?

It doesn't sound like he had a sea anchor or a drogue, or even storm sails. A sea anchor or drogue could have made passage through the storm's path far more comfortable—probably to the point where the crew would not have panicked.

From the Jordan Series Drogue website:

A Tartan 38 left Beaufort, N. C. just after Hurricane Gordon passed over Florida and into the Gulf of Mexico. Unfortunately, the storm reversed direction and recrossed Florida back into the Atlantic, catching the boat a couple of hundred miles out. The storm brought 75 knot winds and 30 ft waves. The crew deployed the drogue at 2.00 PM and rode throughout the night in relative comfort. The boat was undamaged. During the same storm, the Coast Guard airlifted to safety the crew of the 42 ft. ketch Seaflower.

Rhode 41, 70 degrees south in the Atlantic
"I heard this one wave approaching like a steam train, [it] threw the boat over and [i] felt the shocking sensation of huge amounts of water over me; at the same time the noise of breaking glass and all kinds of stuff flying on top of me. The wave threw So Long sideways onto the water; the mast-top was below the surface (toplight was ripped off) and maybe 2,000 liters of seawater entered through the only partly closed companionway. After the knockdown on Friday morning we steered downwind bare-poled, without any sails, and the Aries self-steering kept the boat on course at about 5-6 knots speed. By noon Friday the still increasing wind made the situation critical with still building seas and huge breaking waves. It was not safe anymore to keep the boat unsupported at this speed. For the first time we deployed our new sea-anchor over the stern, a system of 120 little parachutes attached to 200 meters of rope [Jordan Series drogue]. The boat then settled at about two knots of speed and took the breaking seas in a very safe angle over the stern. We could feel the gentle pull of the drogue to keep the boat at a secure angle to the sea... Between Thursday evening and Friday noon the barometer had dropped 18 hp to 992hp, wind north Force 9-10. For the next 41 hours, all day Saturday, until Sunday morning we were drifting with the sea anchor with the wind at storm force and shifting from north to southwest."

BTW, it appears that Ken Barnes did have a JSD aboard his boat... but didn't deploy it until it was too late. I believe this excerpt from the JSD site is about him.

A Tense Moment in Drogue History

National TV news showed a picture of a dismasted yacht located in the western approach to Cape Horn. The picture was taken from a Chilean patrol aircraft. The sea was relatively calm, and trailing from the stem was clearly seen a series drogue.The emails poured in. How did a 44 ft steel yacht manage to capsize with the drogue deployed.

After a day or so a fishing boat managed to rescue the solo skipper. He was in good shape and sent back the following message to Dave, who had sold him the drogue.

"The drogue was set after rollover. I was still moving at less than hull speed with the staysail and did not feel the need to take defensive measures yet. I was making good time and wanted to get around the Horn to avoid the next storm that was coming. Boy was I wrong. Wouldn't go to sea without one.”...

Now, in terms of full disclosure, I am a big fan of the Jordan Series Drogue, and have one for my boat... It does appear that Pfanner had an EPIRB, since they mention a radio beacon.

Also, as Valiente points out.. they had a lot of options, prior to the storm actually hitting...and that they could have taken when first encountering the storm. Also, continuing on their course put them on the dangerous side of the storm... if he had turned around and run with the winds... he would have ended up on the safer left-hand side of the storm...and though he would have lost progress, the winds would have been considerably weaker, since the storm's movement would act to reduce the effective wind speeds... rather than add to them—which is what happens on the dangerous right-hand side of the storm.

While it seems they had more reason to abandon ship than the fools that issued Mayday and ended up asking the Navy for fuel for their sailboat earlier this year... I still think staying aboard the boat would have been far safer.

[Sapperwhite]

Originally Posted by sailingdog

It doesn't sound like he had a sea anchor or a drogue, or even a storm sails. A sea anchor or drogue could have made passage through the storm's path far more comfortable—probably to the point where the crew would not have panicked.

I thought about that too when they said the main was ripped. I said to myself "why the hell is the main out anyway"? That statement about the main kind of stuck out at me.

[RealityCheck]

We all say we know people with do strange things in a panic.... but it is always a surprise when it happens first person.

Without regard to the probably oversight about weather conditions, the apparent panic that drove the people to jump overboard was the most critical problem. While I have not personally seen this exact panic... I unfortunately do have recollections of panic that did result in lost of life when one panicked individual started a "stampede" in an attempt to avoid exactly what they ran into by joining the stampede. One person in panic can endanger everyone and has to be controlled early.. it is like a disease. I would imagine this would be most difficult with the type crew ... friends and wife the master of the vessel had aboard.

In the boat is better than out of the boat is a difficult concept to pass on during panic... it must be covered well prior and understood.

This is a wake up call to me personally as my pre cruise briefings have become more lax than they probably should be. I'll return to the more formal all in the cockpit briefings. It is too late when problems develop.