Obama in Oz - the China factor

[PorFin]

Originally Posted by danjarch

Your skipping over how the US is helping Vietnam fix up it's main port so foreign "American" war ships can make ports of call. Your also skipping over that even though we left the Philippines, we still conduct joint exercises with the Philippine military. And that's the plan. We're no longer building huge bases, instead we're building stronger alliances that are ready to use.

That combined with trade agreements is our way of reminding China that it's not the biggest dog in the Pacific, and it can't bully the smaller nations without getting US push back. Don't forget, China is a country that recently cut off exports of rare raw materials, their navy has been bumping into other countries boats. Those aren't good things. Australia is just being prudent in allowing a few US marines to share their bases and train together. It will make it that much easier to work together if we need to.

Dan,

Perhaps I wasn't as articulate in my first response as I could have been. I am not arguing against the stationing of Marines in Oz, which (as long as the Aussies are on board) I think is a good thing.

The key is the argument of power projection v. permanent presence.

Of the two, power projection is theoretically the less expensive of the two. Without the need of maintaining a forward presence, resources (money, equipment, people, etc.) can be husbanded close to home and sent forward if the need arises. The downside is that getting them to the hotspot quickly and in sufficient numbers to effect positive results can be a very costly proposition -- particularly in terms of lives lost if the entry is into a hostile area. Airfield seizure is a bread and butter operation of our assault forces; port seizure is also critical, and much more complicated.

Joint training exercises are useful, but their payoffs have much more to do with diplomacy than they do with interoperability of forces.

In the case of Vietnam, there's very little to guarantee that VN will remain a willing and welcoming host once those port repairs/upgrades are completed. For joint exercises and other low-risk events it's a safe bet that they will welcome us with open arms. However, once the risks go up (as in once China threatens its much weaker next door neighbor) VN's willingness to have our warships hanging about will go down significantly.

The limited joint exercises we conduct with the Philippine military in no way make up for the closures of Clark and Subic Bay. Are they better than nothing? Of course they are. But consider how much better we'd be able to assist the GoP in their fight against Islamic insurgents if we had a robust permanent presence there -- protected facilities from which we could do round the clock intel collection and when necessary launch offensive operations.

[SloopJonB]

Originally Posted by PorFin

once the risks go up (as in once China threatens its much weaker next door neighbor) VN's willingness to have our warships hanging about will go down significantly.

I'm not so sure about that. Traditionally (apparently) the Vietnamese distrust and dislike, even hate the Chinese - they are and always have been a threat to their independence.

This situation with Viet Nam is pretty routine for countries that fought wars with the USA - afterwards they become the closest of friends. The old Peter Sellers movie "The Mouse That Roared" was based on that very premise. A bankrupt Principality declared war on the States so they could quickly lose and then receive all the aid the USA gives it's defeated foes.

[danjarch]

Originally Posted by PorFin

Dan,

Perhaps I wasn't as articulate in my first response as I could have been. I am not arguing against the stationing of Marines in Oz, which (as long as the Aussies are on board) I think is a good thing.

The key is the argument of power projection v. permanent presence.

Of the two, power projection is theoretically the less expensive of the two. Without the need of maintaining a forward presence, resources (money, equipment, people, etc.) can be husbanded close to home and sent forward if the need arises. The downside is that getting them to the hotspot quickly and in sufficient numbers to effect positive results can be a very costly proposition -- particularly in terms of lives lost if the entry is into a hostile area. Airfield seizure is a bread and butter operation of our assault forces; port seizure is also critical, and much more complicated.

Joint training exercises are useful, but their payoffs have much more to do with diplomacy than they do with interoperability of forces.

In the case of Vietnam, there's very little to guarantee that VN will remain a willing and welcoming host once those port repairs/upgrades are completed. For joint exercises and other low-risk events it's a safe bet that they will welcome us with open arms. However, once the risks go up (as in once China threatens its much weaker next door neighbor) VN's willingness to have our warships hanging about will go down significantly.

The limited joint exercises we conduct with the Philippine military in no way make up for the closures of Clark and Subic Bay. Are they better than nothing? Of course they are. But consider how much better we'd be able to assist the GoP in their fight against Islamic insurgents if we had a robust permanent presence there -- protected facilities from which we could do round the clock intel collection and when necessary launch offensive operations.

I'll second what Sloop said, and add the famous Ho Chi Min quote "that it is better to smell French sh1t for a couple decades the eat Chinese sh1t for a millenia". I'd also add in the leaving the Philippines has only strengthened us more then the bases we held there. It confirm that we live up to our agreements. Including leaving even when it may not be in our own best interest.